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negative critiques. The Advocacy Institute, for instance, has used the study to support its agenda of 
encouraging the passage of smoke-free policies in local communities. In contrast, the National Smokers 
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consulting firm whose president, Michael Evans, is a clinical (teaching) professor at Northwestern 
University. 
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may even hire consultants to help show the merits of their position, the best way to gather and use 
information on important social issues is to conduct a number of research studies. All studies have 
limitations, and the more research conducted the greater the value of the resulting accumulated 
knowledge. We noted in our April 1996 paper and now restate that this study is a first attempt to compile 
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conclusions drawn herein.” 
Keywords 
hotel industry, smoking, consumer behavior 
Disciplines 
Hospitality Administration and Management 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Cornell University. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article or chapter is available at The Scholarly Commons: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/481 
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The April 1996 issue of the Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quar-
terly presented our findings of a study on consumer dining attitudes and behavior 
after passage of the New York City Smoke-Free-Air Act. Since that time the study 
has prompted both public praise and criticism. While some have used this pre-
liminary study to encourage legislators to enact smoking bans, others have pre-
pared detailed negative critiques. The Advocacy Institute, for instance, has used 
the study to support its agenda of encouraging the passage of smoke-free policies 
in local communities. In contrast, the National Smokers Alliance (an advocacy 
group for the tobacco industry) commissioned a critique from the Evans Group, a 
consulting firm whose president, Michael Evans, is a clinical (teaching) professor 
at Northwestern University.1
While it is the case in the world of 
political debate that different sides on 
an issue use persuasion and may even 
hire consultants to help show the mer-
its of their position, the best way to 
gather and use information on impor-
tant social issues is to conduct a num-
ber of research studies. All studies 
have limitations, and the more research 
conducted the greater the value of the 
resulting accumulated knowledge. We 
noted in our April 1996 paper and now 
restate that this study is a first attempt 
to compile consumer-behavior data.
We stated, ‘The conclusions drawn 
from these data should be treated as 
preliminary. Similar results based on 
the collection of additional data in the 
future would strengthen the conclu-
sions drawn herein.”1 2
We are pleased to have been among 
the first to open this area for scientific 
inquiry, but feel that the recent critique 
by the consultant to the National
1 Many restaurant associations have received 
copies o f the Evans Group critique. The Empire 
State Restaurant Association also requested a 
review from Coopers & Lybrand.The full text of 
both documents can be found on the world wide 
web at «http://hotelschool.cornell.edu»
2 See: David Corsun, C hen  Young, and Cathy 
Enz,“Should N Y C ’s Restaurateurs Lighten Up?,” 
Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quar-
terly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April 1996), p. 26.
Smokers Alliance, distributed widely 
to restaurant associations, may confuse 
concerned restaurateurs. While differ-
ences of opinion are always present on 
sensitive issues, the Evans Group cri-
tique attempts to discredit the study 
and distort the contribution this re-
search can make to public debate. We 
are concerned that restaurateurs may 
be lost in the smoke of rhetoric and 
confusion as they try to discern 
whether this form of legislation will 
have a positive or negative impact on 
their businesses. In this paper we re-
view briefly the major findings of our 
study and provide a specific rejoinder 
to the Evans Group critique.
Summary of the Study
Four months after passage of the 
smoking ban we randomly surveyed a 
total of 389 patrons of New York City 
restaurants concerning any changes in 
their dining behavior, their attitudes 
toward and tolerance of smoking, 
spending patterns, and feelings about 
government legislation of smoking. 
Data were collected from patrons as 
they exited a randomly stratified 
sample of Manhattan restaurants dur-
ing both lunch and dinner hours on 
each of the seven days of the week
during August 13-20, 1995. Restaurant 
locations reflected inexpensive, moder-
ate, and expensive priced restaurants 
and those with four different types of 
accommodations, namely: totally 
smoke-free, smoking at the bar, smok-
ing allowed at dining tables, and smok-
ing throughout. Extra effort was made 
to locate restaurants that permitted 
smoking for inclusion in this study 
because after contacting 100 randomly 
selected restaurants, we had not found 
any restaurants that allowed smoking 
at their dining tables. A supplemental 
list of restaurants was compiled using 
The Smoker's Guide to Dining Out in 
New York City and The Insider's Guide 
to Smoking and Dining in Manhattan 
to locate restaurants with these accom-
modations. We didn’t ask respondents 
whether they smoked in advance of 
surveying them. Of the 389 patrons 
who volunteered to participate in our 
survey, 34.4 percent were smokers and
65.6 percent were nonsmokers. A total 
of 71.8 percent were New York City 
residents, 21.2 percent were from the 
metro area, and only 7 percent reported 
a residence outside of the NYC area.
We undertook this study because 
there was a void in the smoking- 
legislation literature in that no studies 
had been conducted in NYC of actual 
consumer behavior. The study’s pur-
pose was to explore consumer attitudes 
toward smoking and the act, the degree 
to which the act was violated by smok-
ers, how the law was being enforced, 
and changes in consumer dining be-
havior. In addition, we devised a clas-
sification scheme to avoid the tendency 
to obscure differences within the 
smoker and nonsmoker consumer
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groups. In summary, the major findings 
were as follows.
Dining Behavior
• 37.6 percent of smokers reported 
that they had dined out less fre-
quently since passage of the act.
• 59.4 percent of smokers reported 
seeking out smoking-permitted 
restaurants.
• 16.5 percent of nonsmokers re-
ported that they had dined out more 
frequently since passage of the act.
• 36.5 percent of nonsmokers re-
ported avoiding smoking-permitted 
restaurants.
Consumer Spending Patterns
• Smokers reported spending $23.91 
and nonsmokers reported spending 
$21.74 per meal dining out.
• Smokers reported dining out 6.6 
times per week and nonsmokers 
said they dined out 5.6 times.
Enforcement and Violation
• 41 percent of smokers reported 
having smoked in a smoke-free area 
in violation of the act.
• 54.6 percent of nonsmokers re-
ported having seen someone smoke 
in a smoke-free area in violation of 
the act.
Attitudes Toward Smoking and 
the Act
• 12.7 percent of smokers and 76.7 
percent of nonsmokers favor the 
act.
• 61.2 percent of smokers and 91.3 
percent of nonsmokers believe 
second-hand smoke is hazardous.
Profile Categories of Smokers and 
Nonsmokers. We classified respon-
dents into five profile types, three for 
smokers and two for nonsmokers. 
Smokers were grouped as violators, 
avoiders, and adapters based on their 
adherence to the law and avoidance of 
smoke-free restaurants. We identified 
two types of nonsmokers based on 
whether they were smoke sensitive 
(and thus avoided smoke-permitting 
restaurants) or smoke tolerant.
• 37 percent of smokers do not 
violate the act or avoid smoke-free 
restaurants.
• Nonsmokers and smokers who are 
adapting to the act account for 84 
percent of the general population.
The Heart of the Controversy
The policy issue for the restaurant in-
dustry rests on the question of whether 
smoke-free legislation will result in net 
revenue declines for local restaurant 
owners—an important issue but not the 
focus of our study. Several studies 
have examined economic issues di-
rectly and found smoke-free ordi-
nances have not led to decreased sales 
revenue among restaurants, although 
these studies have been critiqued.3 
While our study was not on economic 
impact, our paper did present impor-
tant implications for the restaurant in-
dustry based on the behavior reported 
by our respondents, and we offered 
advice to the practitioner audience of 
the Cornell Quarterly. A few excerpts 
show what we suggest:
“ ... nonsmokers who are smoke- 
sensitive are dining out more than 
before. This consumer group is the 
largest, and spends the most overall.” 
“The act has had a decidedly nega-
tive impact on some restaurants, par-
ticularly those restaurants whose smo-
kers come less frequently but which 
have not realized a counterbalancing 
increase in the attendance and spend-
ing of nonsmokers. Conversely, some 
restaurants are probably benefiting 
from the smoke-sensitive nonsmokers’ 
increased dining frequency. Still other 
restaurants remain relatively unaf-
fected with regard to their sales.”
“Our findings suggest that New 
York City’s restaurateurs should 
‘lighten up’ instead of trying to cater to
3 The following studies have found no loss o f 
revenue due to smoke-free policies: “The Effect 
o f Ordinances R equiring Smoke-Free Restau-
rants on Restaurant Sales,” American Journal of 
Public Health, July 1994; “Assessment o f the 
Impact o f a 100% Smoke-Free Ordinance on 
Restaurant Sales— West Lake El ills, Texas,” Mor-
bidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, May 19, 1995. 
A critique o f the studies w ritten by Glantz and 
Smith was prepared by Coopers & Lybrand in 
March 1996.
those who insist on ‘lighting up.’ The 
data indicate it is unwise to try to 
please everyone. Lightening up may 
just mean pleasing the nonsmoking 
majority and making more money in 
the long run.”
“Ultimately, smoke-free legislation 
is likely to have a positive impact on 
restaurant-industry revenues.”
The controversy in the wake of this 
article flows from how various advo-
cacy groups have used our study. The 
Advocacy Institute prepared a strategy 
document advising those who support 
smoke-free legislation to use the study 
and other studies to refute claims that 
restaurants’ clean-indoor-air policies 
harm restaurants economically. The 
National Smokers Alliance sought out 
the Evans Consulting Group to critique 
the study. As researchers, we do not 
side with any group, and our project 
was not funded by an advocacy group. 
Clearly we cannot control how others 
choose to use the study. This response 
to the Evans Group critique was pre-
pared because it is important for the 
many restaurant associations and op-
erators to understand the findings of 
our study. The rest of this paper is our 
response to the Evans Group.
Critique and Rejoinder
The Evans Consulting Group review of 
our Cornell Quarterly article suggested 
several major criticisms which are 
presented below with our responses. 
The president of the Evans Group 
begins the critique as follows:
“The Cornell Survey purports to 
show that the smoking ban on restau-
rants in New York City will not reduce 
restaurant revenues. That conclusion is 
invalid for several reasons.
1. “The Cornell Survey is seriously 
incomplete, because it does not mea-
sure the change in the number of 
times per week that smokers and non-
smokers dined out before and after the 
ban, or the amount spent per meal 
before and after.”
Our study is not invalid because we 
studied something other than what the
Evans Group would have us study. The 
goal of any well-designed survey is to 
answer the questions of interest to the 
researchers conducting the study. A 
reasonable question is whether our 
study correctly investigated the ques-
tions we sought to answer. As noted 
earlier here and in our original article, 
the purpose of our study was to “ex-
plore the actual impact of the act on 
consumer behavior” (p. 26). The data 
presented in our article (see Exhibits 3, 
5, and 6) show the results of investigat-
ing this question.
The Evans Group wishes we had 
studied the economic impact of the bill 
using pre- and post-ban data. It con-
cludes that it could not answer its ques-
tions with our data. We encourage 
researchers to conduct studies on the 
topic of economic impact. Some exist-
ing work in this area is already avail-
able as noted earlier.
2. “The number of nonsmokers 
who spent less time dining out after 
the ban was imposed is slightly higher 
than the number of nonsmokers who 
spent more time dining out. We have 
interpreted this finding to mean that 
the amount spent per meal by non-
smokers did not increase after the ban. 
Using that assumption and incorporat-
ing the other parameters reported in 
the Cornell Survey, we find that the 
imposition of a smoking ban in New 
York City will always result in a de-
cline in restaurant revenues
We are puzzled that the Evans 
Group finds that the smoking ban will 
always result in a decline in restaurant 
revenues without having collected data 
on the economic impact of the act. The 
reviewer argues in criticizing our work 
that the only way to assess the eco-
nomic impact of the ban is by conduct-
ing a pre- and post-ban study. Neither 
the Evans Group nor we conducted 
such a study.
3. “Using the other parameters of 
the Cornell Survey and making reason-
able assumptions about proportional-
ity, we calculate that their survey 
would have shown a 9-percent decline
in restaurant revenues if the rele-
vant before-and-after data had been 
collected. ”
For “purposes of illustration,” the 
Evans Group creates hypothetical pre-
ban numbers and then creates post-ban 
numbers to “show” how revenues 
would decline. We will not enter the 
realm of critiquing the use of “illustra-
tive” hypothetical numbers although 
we find this practice odd, but several 
times the reviewer points to our data in 
making calculations while ignoring it 
at other times.
The reviewer notes, “In order to 
show how the calculations should have 
been performed, we start with the 
Cornell Survey finding that smokers 
are 34.4 percent of the Manhattan 
restaurant-going population and non-
smokers are 65.6 percent ”
The percentages of respondents in 
our study is not a finding, but a sample 
characteristic. We did not find that 
smokers are 34.4 percent of the Man-
hattan restaurant-going population. It is 
not reasonable to assume, simply be-
cause we surveyed 134 smokers who 
constitute 34.4 percent of our total 
sample, that this percentage is the 
proportion of smokers in the general 
population. We randomly asked con-
sumers to respond to our survey, and 
34.4 percent of those voluntary respon-
dents were smokers. We did not wish 
to restrict participation on the basis of 
whether a consumer smoked. As a 
result, more smokers are represented in 
our sample than are present in the 
population (26 percent) because they 
took the time to voluntarily respond to 
our survey. Remember, we did not ask 
about smoking preference as a condi-
tion for participation in our survey.
This information about sampling can 
be found on pages 27-28 of our article. 
Future studies might wish to explore 
the interesting question of what 
percentage of restaurant diners are 
smokers and what percentage are non-
smokers. We used general population 
information as a logical first start.
The Evans group critique continues:
“For purposes of illustration, as-
sume that before the ban, smokers 
dined out an average of 7 times per 
week and spent an average of $25.00 
per meal, and after the ban, they dined 
out an average of 6 times per week and 
spend an average of $20.00 per meal. ”
We would like to suggest that the 
Evans Group start with the Cornell 
Survey findings in building their post-
ban illustration. We found that after the 
ban, smokers dined out an average of
6.6 times per week, so why does the 
reviewer use 6? We found that the 
amount spent on average per meal was 
$23.91 for smokers, so why does the 
reviewer use $20.00? The basic differ-
ence between the Evans illustration 
and the one we conducted in response 
to the commentary is that the Evans 
Group rounded the dining figures from
6.6 to 6 for smokers and from 5.59 to 5 
for nonsmokers.
The critique changes the number of 
dining-out occasions from 6.6 to 6 for 
smokers and from 5.59 to 5 for non 
smokers; and it changes the amount 
spent on average per meal for smokers 
to $20.00 from $23.91 and the average 
spending for nonsmokers to $22.00 
instead of $21.74.
“We find that the imposition of a 
smoking ban in New York City will 
always result in a decline in restaurant 
revenues”
The Evans Group conducted an 
analysis based on numbers it created to 
reach the conclusion of economic de-
cline. We conducted this “illustrative” 
exercise using our study data and 
found the opposite conclusion. No 
justification is provided by the Evans 
Group for its pre-ban numbers. The 
Evans Group ignores our post-ban data 
on average spending per meal and the 
number of times dining out per week 
reported by our respondents. It chooses 
to use the percentage of randomly 
selected smokers and nonsmokers who 
agreed to participate in our study in-
stead of the percentage of these two 
groups represented in the population at 
large. We seriously question this, but
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have created a “case one” with general 
population figures, and a “case two” 
with sample figures. In the accompa-
nying box we show the Evans Group’s 
calculations from which it concludes 
that total restaurant revenues have 
declined by $5.14 per person per week. 
While it was not the intent of our study 
to examine this issue using pre-ban 
assumptions, if we use Evans Group 
assumptions pre-ban, Cornell data 
post-ban, and two different approaches 
to population percentages (ours in case 
one and the Evans Group’s in case 
two), we conclude in both cases that 
total restaurant revenues have in-
creased—in case one by $11.44 and in 
case two $8.21 per person per week. 
The figures presented in the accompa-
nying box fail to support the Evans 
Group claim that imposing a smoking 
ban will always result in a decline in 
restaurant revenues.
Where does the truth lie? The truth 
is that no debate of this kind should be 
conducted by assumption and asser-
tion. The Evans Group assumes post-
ban spending figures that are at vari-
ance with the data we collected and 
then states, “We find that the imposi-
tion of a smoking ban in NYC will 
always result in a decline in restaurant 
revenues.” Using the Evans Group 
assumptions for pre-ban spending we 
find the exact opposite. If we were 
trying to prove an opinion, we might 
follow their lead and conclude that the 
imposition of a smoking ban in New 
York City will always result in an 
increase in restaurant revenues. We do 
not make this conclusion, but only 
show how easy it is to achieve a con-
clusion based on “reasonable” but 
unsupported assumptions.
4. The Evans Group states that there 
are major questionable assumptions 
and methodological errors in the 
Cornell Survey, presenting five points 
that we address in the order each was 
presented.
A. “The choice of Manhattan, in-
stead of all of New York City, is conve-
nient but nonetheless could impart a
Illustrative Examples
Evans Group Figures
Before the Ban
(.344)(7)($25)+
(.656)(5)($20)= $125.80 
Conclusion— Net revenue loss of $5.14
After the Ban
(.344)(6)($20)+ 
(.656)(5.5)($22)= $120.66
.344
.656
7.0
6.0 
5.0 
5.5
$25.00
$20.00
$20.00
$22.00
Percentage of voluntary respondents in Cornell Study who smoke 
Percentage of voluntary respondents in Cornell Study who do not smoke 
Assumed average number of meals per week by smokers, pre act 
Assumed average number of meals per week by smokers, post act 
Assumed average number of meals per week by nonsmokers, pre act 
Assumed average number of meals per week by nonsmokers, post act 
Assumed average amount spent per meal by smokers, pre act 
Assumed average amount spent per meal by smokers, post act 
Assumed average amount spent per meal by nonsmokers, pre act 
Assumed average amount spent per meal by nonsmokers, post act
Cornell Figures
Case One—Using General Population Figures
Before the Ban After the Ban
(.26)(7)($25)+ (.26)(6.6)($23.91)+
(.74)(5)($20)= $119.50 (.74)(5.59)($21.74)= $130.94
Conclusion— Net revenue gain of $11.44
Case Two—Using Cornell Study Figures
Before the Ban After the Ban
(.344)(7)($25)+ (.344)(6.6)($23.91)+
(.656)(5)($20)= $125.80 (.656)(5.59)($21.74)= $134.01
Conclusion— Net revenue gain of $8.21
.260
.740
.344
.656
7.0
6.0 
5.0 
5.5 
$25 
$23.91 
$20.00 
$21.74
Percentage of smokers in the general population 
Percentage of nonsmokers in the general population 
Percentage of respondents in Cornell Study who smoke 
Percentage of respondents in Cornell Study who do not smoke 
Used Evans pre-ban assumptions
Cornell Study average number of meals per week by smokers, post act 
Used Evans pre-act assumptions
Cornell Study average number of meals per week by nonsmokers, post act 
Used Evans pre-act assumptions
Cornell Study average amount spent per meal by smokers, post act 
Used Evans pre-act assumptions
Cornell Study average amount per meal by nonsmokers, post act
In a recent letter to one of the authors, Michael Evans, president of the Evans Group, argues 
that since 34.4 percent of the respondents said they were smokers, this should be the number used 
in calculations regardless of whether the population at large has a smaller percentage of smokers. 
We have used this figure in Case 2 because Evans argues, “I used the figure that 34.4 percent of 
the survey participants are smokers because that is your figure. In denying this, you are essentially 
throwing away the part of your results that you didn’t like, and only keeping the parts you did like.” 
The results are the same, a net gain in revenue.
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bias to the results. Restaurants in the 
outer boroughs are more likely to lose 
smoking patrons to dining facilities 
outside the city limits.... ”
Manhattan was chosen over the 
other boroughs because of its variety 
of restaurants and preponderance of 
business diners and commuters. It is an 
intriguing empirical question for future 
research to determine whether restau-
rants in the outer boroughs are, indeed, 
more likely to lose smoking patrons to 
dining facilities outside the city limits. 
It would also be useful to know if non-
smoking residents of the NYC metro 
area are dining more frequently in the 
city as a result of the smoking ban. 
Clearly a great deal more can be 
learned in subsequent studies.
B. “The choice of April and August 
as comparative dates may also bias 
results. Many New York residents— 
especially those in Manhattan—tend to 
go on vacation during the month of 
August. Also, tourists to Manhattan 
during August tend to be family groups 
rather than business visitors. ”
A total of 93 percent of the sample 
are residents of the NYC metro area, 
the vast majority of whom live in NYC 
(71.8 percent). A total of 7 percent fall 
in the “other” category, which may 
include vacationers or business travel-
ers from out of town. Clearly the sam-
ple more than adequately represents 
New York residents and is not biased 
toward tourists, given their small rep-
resentation in this study. Data were 
gathered at lunch and dinner hours and 
in restaurants ranging in price from 
inexpensive to expensive. See Exhibit 
2, p. 28, for all demographic data.
C. “Gains in people dining out and 
increased spending in post-ban Man-
hattan are probably due to the boom in 
the stock market and are associated 
with those employed in the brokerage 
industry eating out more than those in 
other industries. ”
While these speculations can hardly 
be evidence of our “unsubstantiated 
assumptions” in any event, we note a 
careful sampling process in which we
surveyed respondents at 19 different 
restaurant locations throughout Man-
hattan (not just the financial district) 
and at both lunch and dinner periods. 
See pages 27-28 for a detailed discus-
sion of our sampling procedure.
D. “Since nonsmokers said they 
dined outside NYC more frequently, this 
indicates that smoke-free restaurants 
were not as important to them as one 
would expect. Since only around 15 per-
cent of nonsmokers are dining out more 
frequently, this behavior may be due to 
economic factors and not the ban. ”
It is the case that 31.4 percent of the 
nonsmokers in our sample said they 
dined outside of NYC more frequently 
since the ban was in effect in April. As 
easily as one might reach the conclu-
sion the reviewer reaches about the im-
portance of smoke-free environments 
to nonsmokers, one could speculate 
that this behavior is due to the summer 
vacations and weekend homes of NYC 
residents. However, we do not have 
data on why this group of nonsmokers 
is dining outside NYC. It is also the 
case that 36.5 percent of nonsmokers 
report increases in avoidance of smok-
ing-permitted restaurants. A total of 
34.4 percent of smoke-sensitive non-
smokers report dining out more fre-
quently since the act. This group of 
nonsmokers appears to be dining out 
far more frequently than the other type 
of nonsmokers, making the impact of 
economic factors less likely than the 
impact of smoking bans.
E. “The authors emphasize the fact 
that 34.4% of ‘smoke-sensitive diners’ 
are now dining out more frequently 
(Exhibit 7). However, since Exhibit 3 
states that 31.4% of nonsmokers are 
dining more frequently outside NYC, 
that 34.4% may be composed almost 
exclusively of diners who chose to 
patronize restaurants outside the city, 
rather than smoke-free restaurants 
within the city.”
Here the reviewer has posed an 
empirical question that our data do 
permit us to answer. The data indicate 
that only 16.7 percent of smoke-
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sensitive nonsmokers dine outside of 
NYC more frequently than they did 
prior to April. The nonsmokers (62.25 
percent) who reported dining more 
frequently outside NYC after the ban 
are in the smoke-tolerant group. As 
mentioned in point D above, the data 
do not permit us to state why anyone is 
dining outside NYC more frequently 
during the April to August period in 
1995. Remember also that 34.4 percent 
of smoke-sensitive nonsmokers re-
ported dining out more frequently in 
the months after the ban, and all 
smoke-sensitive nonsmokers avoid 
smoke-permitting restaurants.
Cautions and Conclusions
This response is our effort to clarify 
and set the record straight on the integ-
rity of our study. What have been iden-
tified by the Evans Group critique as 
errors, flaws, unsubstantiated assump-
tions, and bias seem to be findings or 
data that do not support a particular 
position. It is easier to fault existing 
research when it conflicts with what 
you want to find than to conduct your 
own research. It is also possible that 
the aggressive critique is a reaction not 
to the study itself, but to the fact that 
the study is being used by contesting 
advocacy groups.
The Advocacy Institute is primarily 
concerned with public-health issues. In 
contrast, advocates for the tobacco in-
dustry (including the National Smokers 
Alliance) are interested in preserving 
the economic future of that industry. 
Both groups are sensitive to the eco-
nomic impact on local restaurants, but 
have broader primary agendas outside 
the hospitality industry. We hope this 
response to the issues raised by the 
Evans Group and the NS A will provide 
some clarity for restaurateurs and en-
courage neutral researchers to consider 
extending this study. The study on 
consumer dining behavior was neither 
definitive nor flawed, it was simply the 
first of its kind. Now let’s move on to 
new studies that help to refine and 
clarify this sensitive issue. □
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